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“On Friday September 4th 1994, the freezer belonging to Gloria and Steve Kanoy of 
Weere’s Cove suddenly and mysteriously broke down.  Distraught, the couple set off the 
next day in search of a new one.  Stopping for gas at Lake Raceway, 607 Main Avenue, 
they decided to buy a Lotto ticket…”  
Virginia Lottery winner awareness campaign, quoted in Clotfelter and Cook (1990) 
 
1.  Introduction 
Why do risk-averse individuals gamble? One explanation, first developed by Ng 
(1965), is that discreteness in spending or in labour supply opportunities can induce local 
non-concavities in the value functions of risk-averse agents. This generates local risk-
loving behaviour and makes it rational for them to gamble in order to have a chance of 
crossing the threshold required to finance a lumpy purchase, such as the freezer in the 
quote above. Bailey et al (1980) argued that access to credit markets made such gambling 
irrational, but Hartley and Farrell (2002) showed theoretically that rational gambling 
might still occur where borrowing and lending rates differ, where capital market 
imperfections exist, or if individuals' time preference rates differ from interest rates. 
Whilst this may be true in theory, there is a lack of empirical research that addresses 
whether consumers “gamble to convexify” in practice. This is the focus of this paper, 
using data from the UK. 
This is important for three key reasons. First, and most obviously, it helps to 
understand (at least part of) the demand for gambling and lotteries. In the UK, this 
includes the National Lottery, the largest state-run lottery in the world with average 
weekly sales of £36 million, and also premium bonds, a government bond which pays a 
return in the form of an entry to a prize draw, which are held by an estimated 40 per cent 
of households. Tufano (2008) and Kearney et al (2010) have emphasized the 
entertainment aspect of prize-linked savings products in explaining their potential 
attraction. The desire for convexification provides another rationalization for that demand 
despite individuals being risk averse. In many developing countries, there is also the 
interesting case of rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), discussed by 
Besley et al (1993).  These are a micro-finance initiative in which groups of individuals 
make regular contributions to a fund, the total amount of which is allocated to one 3 
member each cycle via a lottery. Handa and Kirton (1999) provide evidence from 
Jamaica that people use their allocation from the ROSCA to buy durable goods.  
Second, a number of authors, notably Imbens et al. (2001), have used lotteries to 
estimate income effects in labour supply and consumption demands. Income effects are 
central to policy evaluation, but standard estimation procedures suffer from a lack of 
plausibly exogenous variation in income. Imbens et al. exploit the fact that lottery 
winnings provide random variation in income among lottery players. Of course, as 
Imbens et al.  recognise, those who play the lottery may differ from those who do not. 
The key point we make is that the “convexification” hypothesis provides a compelling 
economic rationale for expecting this to be the case. In particular, the desire to convexify 
generates a demand for lotteries among precisely those individuals who are close to the 
threshold of a discrete decision (for example, purchasing a durable or retiring) and who 
therefore will display large income effects. The resulting threat to the external validity of 
the estimates is analogous to randomization bias (Heckman and Smith, 1995) in 
randomized trials: those who participate in the random allocation of treatment are 
systematically different from those who do not. An empirical strategy of measuring 
income effects based on lottery winnings may thus overestimate the average response to a 
more broadly distributed windfall. Interestingly, Imbens et al. report that lottery winnings 
appear to have larger effects on discrete margins, such as retirement. 
The third reason the convexification hypothesis is important arises because non-
convexities due to the discreteness of choices pose a major technical challenge to 
researchers trying to model those choices structurally with dynamic programming 
models. One way to overcome this problem has been to assume that individuals facing 
such non-convexities play wealth lotteries (Rogerson, 1988; Lentz and Traneas, 2004).  It 
is important to establish whether this is simply a technical convenience or whether this 
captures the way that individuals actually behave when faced with non-convexities.  
To highlight the mechanisms at work, we first develop a simple model where 
consumers choose whether or not to buy a lottery ticket, and then after the outcome of the 
lottery is known, whether or not to buy an indivisible good.  The only consumers who 
buy the lottery ticket are those who are close to the threshold of being able to buy the 
indivisible good. A lottery win then enables the purchase of the indivisible good.  4 
To look for evidence that consumers gamble to convexify we use data from the 
British Household Panel Survey. Our empirical strategy is effectively a “difference-in-
difference” design, contrasting estimated income effects for lottery windfalls with those 
for other windfalls (specifically inheritances) among those that are credit constrained with 
those that are not. We use the group who are not credit constrained to control for more 
general differences in responses by windfall type – including the degree to which 
alternative windfalls are anticipated, unobservable characteristics of individuals who 
gamble and inherit or psychological feelings attached to different sources of windfall. We 
also use data on financial expectations to examine directly whether inheritances are more 
anticipated than lottery winds. There is no evidence in these data that this is the case. 
Our main result is that, among individuals who are credit constrained, purchases 
of consumer durable goods are more responsive to a lottery win than to receipt of other 
windfall income: individuals whose income increases by gambling and winning are more 
likely to be buying durables. This is not the case among individuals who are not credit 
constrained. This finding is exactly what we would expect if credit-constrained 
consumers gamble to convexify. As a further test, we examine the effects of non-lottery 
windfalls on individuals who can be inferred to have played the lottery but not had large 
winnings. For the subset of these individuals who are credit constrained, purchases of 
consumer durable goods are more responsive to non-lottery windfall income than 
purchases by non-players: those who play the lottery exhibit larger income effects than 
those that do not play. Thus, consistent with our hypothesis, it is not the source of the 
money (lottery versus other windfall) that matters, but rather that lottery players that are 
different from non-players.  
We are not claiming that the desire to convexify explains all gambling, but our 
results suggest that it is a reason why some people gamble, and that therefore the use of 
lottery winnings as an instrument for identifying income effects will have very poor 
external validity: this instrument identifies the income effect for a group with very large 
income effects.   
An outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section we develop the 
theoretical framework that guides our analysis. In Section 3 we examine the implications 
of the model for the resulting income effects if lotteries are endogenously chosen. Section 5 
4 describes our data and empirical framework. Section 5 presents our main results, and 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  A Model of Gambling to Finance Indivisible Purchases 
Our model is a one period model with two stages.
1 At the start of the period (in 
the first stage), agents have cash on hand  1 x . They first make a decision about whether or 
not to buy at most one lottery ticket:  { } 0,1 l∈ , where the price of the lottery ticket is 1. 
They then discover whether or not they have won. The lottery ticket is actuarially fair:
2 
an agent holding a ticket wins 1 q with probability q, so that net winnings are ( ) 1 qq −  
with probability qand  1 −  with probability 1 q − . Net winnings augment an agent’s cash-
on-hand. Thus,  21 x x = if a ticket is not purchased, but if a ticket is purchased, disposable 
cash-on-hand will be   ( ) 21 1 x xq q =+−  with probability qand  21 1 xx =−  with 
probability1 q − .  
After lottery winnings are revealed, individuals decide, in the second stage, how 
to allocate their spending between a divisible consumption good and an indivisible 
consumption good. Agents can buy at most one unit of the indivisible good ( 0,1 d ∈ ) at 
price p . In our empirical work, the indivisible goods will be consumer durables. Without 
borrowing or saving, consumption of the divisible good is just 2 x dp − . Individuals 
maximize utility, which depends on the consumption of divisible and indivisible goods: 
22 (, ) () vx d pd ux d p d η −= − + ;  ηis a preference parameter. We assume that  () '0 u ⋅ > , 
() '' 0 u ⋅<  and  (0) ( ) uu p η + < , where this last condition specifies that the individual will 
not buy the indivisible good if this implies 0 consumption of the divisible good. 
3  
                                                 
1 This means we can abstract from borrowing and saving. As discussed later, the ability to borrow and save 
is likely to reduce the need to gamble to convexify. We exploit this difference in our estimation procedure, 
but we abstract from this in our model to make the motive for gambling transparent. 
2 We could introduce a penalty for gambling and make the gamble actuarially unfair, but this would simply 
act to offset the motive to gamble caused by the non-convexity.    
3 The additive separability assumed here is not necessary. It is however necessary to restrict the degree of 
substitutability between durable and non-durable consumption.  6 
We solve this simple model by backward induction. Define 
1
22 2 () ( )
d Vxu x p η
= =− +  and 
0
22 2 () ()
d Vxu x
= = . The indivisible good is purchased if and 
only if 
10
22 22 () ()
dd VxVx
== ≥ ,   ie.  22 () ( ) ux p ux η − +≥ .   
 
Result 1 (single-crossing): There is a unique 
*
2 x   such that the indivisible good is 
purchased if and only if 
*
22 x x ≥  . 
*
2 x  is implicitly defined by 
**
22 () ( ) ux p ux η −+ = .  
Proof:  Uniqueness follows from the fact that  
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∂∂ (1)
 
which in turns follows from the concavity of  ( ) u ⋅ .  
This difference in the derivative of the conditional value functions implies that the 
unconditional value function is non-concave because the derivative changes discretely at 
the point where the two value functions cross. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1, Single Crossing, About Here] 
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Proof: See appendix.  7 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If 
*
12 1 xx >+   the agent 
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=  (which is inherited from the concavity of  ( ) u ⋅ ) 
ensures that the agent does not gamble. If  ( )
*
12 1 x xq q <− −  the agent does not purchase 




=  is relevant, 




=  (which is inherited from the concavity of ( ) u ⋅ ) ensures that the 
agent does not gamble. The bounds, ( )
*
2 1 x qq −−  and 
*
2 1 x +  are illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
[Figure 2, Regions] 
 
Corollary 1: A lottery winner always purchases the indivisible good.  
Proof: Since lottery tickets are never bought if  ( )
*
12 1 x xq q <− − , a lottery winner (with 
net winnings ( ) 1 qq − ) always has 
*
22 x x ≥ . 
Corollary 2: A lottery player that does not win does not purchase the indivisible good.  
Proof: Since lottery tickets are never bought if 
*
12 1 xx ≥+ , any unsuccessful lottery 
player (with net winnings  1 − ) always has 
*
22 x x < . 
Result 3: There exists a compact region,  11 1 , x xx ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦,  which contains
*
2 x   ()
*
121 x xx << , 
in which the agent will purchase a lottery ticket.  
Proof: See appendix.  
From Result 2, we know that  ( )
**
21 1 2 11 x q q xxx − − ≤<≤+ . Within these bounds, 
the size of the region 11 1 , x xx ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦  depends on parameter values ( , q η and the curvature of 
of  ( ) u ⋅ ). 
Together, Corollaries 1 and 2, and Result 3 imply that the state space (of cash on 
hand) can be divided into three regions. A region  11 x x ≤  in which the agent does not buy 
a lottery ticket and does not buy the indivisible good; a region  111 x xx < ≤ in which the 
agent buys a lottery ticket and then buys a durable if and only if she wins the lottery; and 8 
a region 11 x x >   in which the agent does not buy the lottery ticket but does buy the 
indivisible good.  This is illustrated in Figure 2.  
What this simple model illustrates is that lottery players are very likely to be close 
to the margin of a discrete decision. This implication that lottery players are gambling to 
convexify is tested in section 4 by looking at the income effects of gamblers and non-
gamblers. In the next section we show the implications of our model for using lotteries to 
estimate income effects. Estimated income effects form the basis of subsequent empirical 
tests. 
 
3  Implications for Estimating Income Effects 
In this section, we show that the estimated income effect (i.e. the effect of income 
on the purchase of an indivisible good) associated with an endogenously chosen lottery 
will be a biased estimate of the population average income effect. To show this, we 
consider the follow thought experiment, which we refer to as a randomly assigned lottery: 
a random fraction (λ ) of the population is compelled to buy the lottery ticket, and no 
other tickets are available. This thought experiment holds the number of tickets constant, 
but removes the element of choice from gambling. This leads to a measure of the income 
effect from lottery winnings when the lottery ticket purchase is random, and thus to a 
population average income effect. 
We consider two cases, corresponding to two different data structures. In the first 
case, as in Imbens et al. (2001), income effects are estimated by comparing lottery 
winners and lottery losers (i.e. people who play the lottery, but lose). In the second case, 
the comparison is between winners and non-winners; the latter includes both losers and 
non-players.  We show that in both cases the extra spending by winners is a biased 
estimate of the population average income effect (which would be the income effect 
arising from a truly exogenous windfall.) 
 
3.1. Comparing Winners and Losers.   
First, consider the comparison between lottery winners and lottery losers. In the 
model developed above, an agent always buys the indivisible good if they are a lottery 
winner (Corollary 1). Thus in this model, in which lottery playing is a choice, the 9 
probability that a lottery winner purchases the indivisible good is one: 
(1 | , ) 1 Prob d winner choice == . We condition the probability on “choice” to indicate that 
playing the lottery was a decision taken by the individual. These probabilities are 
summarized in Table 1.  
In the case of the randomly allocated lottery on the other hand, lottery winners 
who have net winnings of ( ) 1 qq −  giving  ( ) 21 1 x xq q =+− , will purchase the 
indivisible good  if  ( )
*
12 1 x xq q ≥− − . Thus 
( ) ( )
*
2 (1 | , ) 1 1 Prob d winner rand F x q q == − − − . 
Thus winners from the chosen lottery are more likely to purchase the indivisible 
good than winners of the randomly allocated lottery:  
0
1
) , | 1 ( Pr ) , | 1 ( Pr
*






− = = − =
q
q
x F rand winner d ob choice winner d ob
(4)
 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. In the case of the randomly allocated 











2 and will not 
have enough cash on hand to buy the divisible good even if they win.   This difference 
tends to zero as q becomes increasingly small: if there is a lottery prize that is very large 
but with a very small probability of winning, it is in the interest of everyone with cash-
on-hand below 
*
2 x  to gamble to convexify, and all winners will chose to buy the 
indivisible good, whether the lottery ticket was chosen or randomly allocated. 
For those that chose to play, but lost, the probability that the non-winner 
purchases the indivisible good is zero:  (1 |, ) 0 Prob d lost choice = = . By comparison, 
among the losers in the randomly allocated lottery are some people with cash on hand 
above the upper threshold ( ) 1
*
2 + x who will have enough cash on hand to purchase the 
divisible good even if they lose, i.e.  ( ). 1 1 ) , | 1 ( Pr
*
2 + − = = x F rand lost d ob  The 
probability of purchase is therefore lower among losers of the endogenous lottery than 
among losers of the randomly allocated lottery:  
( ) 0 1 1 ) , | 1 ( Pr ) , | 1 ( Pr
*
2 ≤ − + = = − = x F rand loser d ob choice loser d ob (5) 10 
Putting together the differences in purchase probabilities between winners and the 
difference in purchase probabilities between losers, it is clear that the income effect in the 
case of the endogenous lottery suffers from upward bias compared to income effect from 
the randomly allocated lottery. The latter is an unbiased estimate of the population 
average income effect. An expression for the bias is given in the final row of the second 
d 
column of Table 1. The size of the bias becomes smaller as the range in which tickets are 
bought becomes larger.  
 
3.2. Comparing Winners and Non-winners   
Non-winners comprise both non-players and losers. In the case of the endogenous 
lottery, those who choose not to play are those with   11 x x <  or  11 x x >  while losers are 
the fraction 1 q −  of lottery players, who all have  111 x xx < ≤ . Of these non-winners, only 
agents with cash on hand  11 x x >  buy the indivisible good. Let λ denote the faction of 
lottery players:  ( ) ( ) 11 Fx Fx λ =−, where  ( ) F ⋅ is the cumulative distribution of cash on 
hand ( 1 x ) in the population.  Thus 
  ( ) ( ) 11 11
(1 | , )
1() 1
F xF x






The effect of winning the lottery (relative to non-winners) on the probability of 

























In the randomly assigned lottery, non-winners comprise those that were randomly 
allocated a ticket but did not win, and those that were not allocated a ticket. The former 
are fraction (1 ) q λ − of the population, have net winnings of  1 − and purchase the durable 
if 
*
12 1 xx ≥+ .  The latter are fraction (1 ) λ − of the population, have net winnings of 0and 11 
purchase the durable if 
*
12 x x ≥ . The overall fraction of the population that are non-
winners is, as before, (1 ) (1 ) 1 qq λ λλ −+ − = − . Thus the fraction of non-winners who 
purchase the durable is: 
 
()
() () () ()
**
22
(1 , , )
(1 | , )
,
(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) 1
1
Prob d non winner rand
Prob d non winner rand
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This can be interpreted more easily if we approximate 
*
2 (1 ) Fx+  by 
*
2 () Fx : this is a good 
approximation if the price of the lottery ticket, 1, is small compared to typical cash-on-
hand. The probability then becomes:  
  ( ) ( )( )
*
2 11
(1 | , )
1
F xq








The denominator is the fraction of the population who are not winners. The first part of 
the numerator,  ()
*
2 1 F x − , is the fraction of all individuals whose cash-on-hand means 
they would purchase the durable regardless of the lottery. Some of these individuals will 
be winners when the lottery tickets are randomly allocated and so this fraction is 
multiplied by the fraction of the population that are not winners.
  
By contrast, when the purchase of the lottery ticket was a choice, none of those 
individuals who would purchase regardless of the lottery choose to buy lottery tickets and 
so they are all non-winners, and the probability of purchasing the durable among non-
winners is given by equation (6).  
To aid interpretation of the difference between equation (9) and (6), approximate 
1 () Fx  by
*
2 () Fx  (recall from Results 2 and 3 that 
**
212 1 xxx < ≤+ ). This gives a difference 






(1 | , ) (1 | , ) 0
1
qF x









The probability of purchasing the durable among the non-winners from the chosen lottery 
is higher. This arises from a subtle composition effect because the group of non-winners 
comprises two sets of individuals: those who did not have a ticket and those that had a 
losing ticket. Some of those who were non-winners by choice (ie chose not to have a 
ticket because they would have purchased the durable anyway) became random lottery 
winners, and this reduces the number of purchasers of the durable among those who were 
not winners. 
When we compare winners and non-winners of the lottery, the probability of 
purchasing the durable is higher among both winners and losers when the lottery ticket is 
chosen. This implies that the effect of winning the (chosen) lottery on durable purchases 
may be greater or smaller than the effect of winning on purchases when the allocation is 
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When the probability of winning, q, is small and the prize large, the first term on the 
numerator is close to zero and the negative composition effect might dominate. On the 
other hand, as q gets larger, the second term tends to  q λ and the net effect is positive: the 
effect of the winners of the chosen lottery being more likely to purchase the durable 
dominates.  
These two offsetting differences can be highlighted by calculating numerically the 
size of the effects in our simple model, at particular parameter values. We assume log 
utility for consumption, and consider a high and low value for the utility of the durable 
(η ). Figure 3 shows the difference in the probability of purchase between the chosen and 
random lotteries. For these parameters, estimates of the effect of a windfall on the 
purchase of the durable from lotteries will overestimate the effect of a random windfall 
except for very small values of q.  13 
 
[Figure 3, Simulation, About Here] 
 
3.3.  Discussion 
 
The aim of this model was to highlight the differing income effects arising from 
different sorts of windfall gain. In particular, the effect of a windfall on indivisible 
purchases is likely to be larger if the windfall arises from a lottery that the household has 
chosen to participate in.  This arises because the indivisibility means households have an 
incentive to gamble to convexify. However, the strength of this incentive will be 
diminished if capital markets are well functioning, and so agents can borrow or save, 
because this allows the path of non-durable consumption to be unaffected by the timing 
of indivisible purchases (Bailey et al., 1980; Hartley and Farrell, 2002). The need to 
gamble to convexify is also diminished if there are multiple indivisible goods so that the 
indivisibility is less “lumpy”, or if there are uninsurable income shocks which provide 
some convexification. This means that the importance of the convexification hypothesis 
is an empirical question, and in the remainder of this paper we assemble empirical 
evidence on this question. While data on lottery players cleanly identifies the income 
effect among players, this data structure is incapable of shedding light on the 
convexification hypothesis that the income effects among lottery players are different 
from those of nonplayers. Thus we turn to a general population survey. We can however 
also use our general survey to approximate the data set focused only on lottery players 
used by Imbens et al (2001) (see the discussion of the small winnings test in Sections 4 
and 5).  
 
4. Empirical Framework and Data  
4.1. Empirical framework 
We adopt a reduced form empirical approach but one that is directly motivated by 
the discussion in the previous section. There we showed that endogenous gambling 
results in income effects that are biased compared to those based on an exogenous 
windfall. Our main empirical strategy is to examine a difference-in-difference in income 
effects. In particular, we compare the effect of windfalls on purchases of indivisible 14 
goods between lottery winners
4 and those who receive another type of windfall – namely 
an inheritance, and we compare these differences between those who are likely to be 
credit constrained and those who are not.  
In the context of the model above, inheritances are intended to approximate the 
randomly allocated lottery. The assumption is not that inheritances are random across the 
population, but that they are exogenous with respect to the distance between cash on hand 
( 1 x ) and the critical value (
*
2 x ), conditional on controls and individual fixed effects. Note 
that the critical value will vary in the population and over time for a given individual 
according to tastes and needs.  
Our empirical work focuses on durable goods, which are inherently indivisible; 
our prediction is that durable purchases will respond differently to a lottery win than to an 
inheritance because the people who receive lottery winnings are on average closer to the 
threshold of a discrete purchase. This is the convexification hypothesis and it is a 
selection effect: different windfalls are received by different people.  
If we find that durable purchases respond differently to a lottery win than to an 
inheritance, we need to rule out alternative interpretations. First, it could be that some 
other kind of selection is operative: lottery winners differ from inheritors, but not because 
of a need for convexification. Second, it may be that the same individuals respond to 
different kinds of windfall differently: it is the source of money, rather than the 
individual, that matters.  
With respect to alternative selection stories, lottery winners may be systematically 
different to those who inherit with respect to other unobservable characteristics such as 
tastes for durables, risk aversion, or impatience. We estimate a fixed effects regression 
model, which allows us to control for the confounding effect of unobservable 
characteristics on durable purchases, but not for differences in how the purchase of 
durables respond to income shocks.  
Even conditional on fixed effects in the levels of durables demand, lottery winners 
may respond differently to income shocks for some reason other than the convexification 
                                                 
4 The BHPS question actually asks about all gambling wins. In practice, 79% of all spending on gambling 
is on the UK National Lottery, according to the Expenditure and Food Survey. This is a general household 
survey that is unlikely to capture serious gamblers, but it is similar to the BHPS sample. “Lottery wins” is 
therefore a shorthand for all gambling wins. 15 
hypothesis. We control for other differences in income effects between lottery players 
and inheritors by comparing responses to a lottery win and an inheritance across two 
types of households: those that are credit constrained and those that are not.  As noted in 
the previous section, we would not expect unconstrained households to use a lottery as a 
means of financing indivisible purchases when they have savings or are able to borrow 
because of the relatively high cost of gambling.
5 Focusing on those who are credit 
constrained in this way, the group of people who are not credit constrained allows us to 
control for differences in income effects between lottery winners and inheritors that are 
common to credit constrained and unconstrained individuals. Thus, as noted above, our 
empirical strategy amounts to examining a “difference-in-differences” in income effects: 
we compare estimated income effects between lottery wins and inheritances, for the 
credit constrained and the unconstrained.
6  
The bottom line is that the convexification hypothesis is a selection mechanism 
that operates on variables (the need for durables, cash on hand) that vary through time, 
and that operates only for the credit-constrained. By allowing for fixed effects in 
estimating income effects, and by double-differencing income effects (across the 
constrained and unconstrained, and across inheritors and lottery winners), we rule out any 
alternative selection mechanism which operates on time invariant unobservables, and any 
mechanism which is not limited to the credit constrained. It is still possible (if 
improbable) that there is an alternative, time-varying selection mechanism that operates 
only on gamblers who are credit-constrained.  We address this possibility by 
implementing a falsification test involving non-durable consumption. We return to the 
details of this test below. 
With respect to the source of the money being the key difference, inheritances 
may be anticipated, as discussed by Hurst and Lusardi (2004). However, we present 
evidence below showing that household financial expectations and consumption do not 
adjust in anticipation of an inheritance, suggesting that at least the timing and amount of 
inheritance may not be anticipated.  
                                                 
5 The expected return in the case of the National Lottery, for example is only 0.5. 
6 Note that this is a difference-in-difference in spending responses; thus it could equally be described as a 
triple-difference in spending levels.  16 
Another way in which the source of the money may matter is if it affects what 
people feel that they can spend the money on.  This idea was termed “emotional 
accounting” by Levav and McGraw (2005) and nicely summarised by Epley and Gneezy 
(2007) in the following way: “although all dollars are created equal, one may feel a pang 
of reluctance at spending grandma’s inheritance on a new sports car, but little reluctance 
spending casino earnings doing the same.” They showed in lab experiments that $200 
hypothetically received by students from an ill uncle was less likely to be spent on a 
frivolous item than $200 from a rich uncle.  In our case, compared to a “lucky” lottery 
win, an inheritance may come with negative associations causing consumers to avoid 
frivolous or hedonic purchases so as not to exacerbate any bad feelings.  
We deal with this possibility in two ways. First, our difference-in-difference 
strategy controls for this possibility as long as “emotional accounting” (or other 
psychological explanations) operate similarly for those who are credit constrained and 
those who are not. 
Second, we pursue a second empirical test of the convexification hypothesis. The 
basis of the test is this: among the people who received an inheritance there are likely to 
be some who were gambling to convexify, but who lost the (endogenously-selected) 
gamble. We would expect these people to behave like the typical person winning the 
gamble rather than like the typical person receiving an inheritance. We exploit the fact 
that, while we do not observe people spending money on gambling, we do observe people 
who win small amounts (defined as less than £100). These amounts are not enough, 
typically, to finance consumer durables directly but they do allow us to identify people 
who have gambled. Thus we test whether the income effect of inheritances is larger for 
credit constrained individuals who we know were gambling because we observe that they 
they had small winnings. If this is the case, then it makes it clear that it is who receives 
the windfall that matters, rather than the source of the windfall, and thus the explanation 
must be a selection story like the convexification hypothesis. 
As a final empirical strategy which addresses both the possibility that the source 
of money matters and alternative selection stories which affect only those who are credit-
constrained and gamble, we implement a falsification test. The convexification 
hypothesis suggests that among the credit-constrained, lottery players (and hence 17 
winners) are selected with respect to their marginal propensity to spend on indivisible 
goods.  Our falsification test compares the income response of spending on divisible 
nondurable consumption (food at home and in restaurants) to lottery wins and 
inheritances. If we see a difference in income effects between credit-constrained lottery 
winners and credit-constrained inheritors, but only for the indivisible goods in our data 
and not for indivisible goods, it will provide further support for the convexification 
hypothesis.  
  To implement our first, difference-in-difference test, we estimate an 
empirical model along the following lines: 
   () ( ) 12 1 2 ' it i it i it it it dQ L o t Q I n h X u ββ γγ α =+ ++ + +   (12) 
Where dit is measure of durable purchases by agent household i at time t; Qi = 1 if 
the agent  is credit constrained, and equals 0 otherwise; Lotit and Inhit are financial 
windfalls from lottery wins and inheritances, respectively;  it X is a vector of other 
variables that might affect purchase of durables, including age, composition of household 
(couple, number of kids), home-ownership status, permanent income (proxied by 
spending on food), employment status, financial expectations, year dummies, and  it u   is a 
random error term.  
Previous empirical literature has shown that durables respond to unexpected 
windfalls (see Keeler, James and Abdel-Ghany, 1985), so we would expect that 
0 1 1 ≥ = γ β . The theoretical considerations developed in the previous section suggest 
that, among credit constrained households, selection into playing the lottery will lead to 
differential responses to a lottery win compared to other windfalls, in other words that 
() ( ) 2 1 2 1 γ γ β β + ≠ + .  
Our falsification test estimates a parallel model, with measures of nondurable 
(divisible) spending as the dependent variable. 
To estimate our second, “small winnings” test, we estimate the following 
empirical model: 
() ( ) ( ) 12 1 2 12 ' it i it i it i it it it it d Q Lot Q Inh Q SmLot Inh X u ββ γγ δδ α =+ ++ ++ × + +
(13) 18 
where SmLotit = 1 if someone receives a lottery win of less than £100, and equals 0 
otherwise.  Our hypothesis is that, among credit constrained households, those who 
receive a medium-sized inheritance and also a small lottery win will not behave like 
those who only received a medium-sized inheritance, ie. ( ) 120 δδ + ≠ , but rather will 
have the larger income responses of those who receive a medium-sized lottery win, i.e. 
() ( ) ( ) () 12 12 12 ββ γγ δδ +=++ + . 
 
4.2 Data 
Our main analysis uses data taken from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) from 1997 – 2006 since this contains information on both durable purchases and 
financial windfalls. Beginning in 1991, this survey has annually interviewed members of 
a representative sample of around 5,500 households. On-going representativeness of the 
non-immigrant population is maintained by using a “following rule” – i.e. by following 
original sample members (adult and children members of households interviewed in the 
first wave) if they move out of the household or if their original household breaks up.
7 
We select single and two-adult households where the head is aged 20 – 70. Our analysis 
sample contains information on 6,148 households (29,886 observations).  
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Consumer Durables 
Information on purchases of consumer durables from the BHPS is given in Table 
2.  These are selected from a wider set of durables that households are asked about on the 
grounds that they are largely unchanged over the period and that they are genuinely 
“lumpy” to purchase new. This means we exclude, for example, VCRs which were 
becoming increasingly obsolete towards the end of the period and microwaves and CD 
players where the typical expenditure is fairly low.  On average, 36% households had 
purchased at least one of the six durables over the previous year; 12% purchased two or 
more. In the case of most of the durables (except for dishwashers and home computers), 
they are bought by similar proportions of credit constrained and unconstrained 
                                                 
7 The survey incorporated booster samples from Scotland and Wales in 1999 and Northern Ireland in 2001, 
but we restrict our sample to original sample members.  19 
households. This is a set of basic durables that most households seek to replace on a 
regular basis, although credit constrained households typically spend less.  
In principle, households could potentially smooth their spending on new durables. 
One possibility is renting, although this may be easier for some durables (televisions, for 
example) than for others (fridge-freezers).  Also, most rental companies have a minimum 
rental period of 12 or 18 months and require a credit check, so the option of renting may 
not be open to everyone.  Similarly, hire purchase companies also require a credit check 
and may charge high interest rates if the repayments are made over a long period. 
Compared to these alternatives, buying a lottery ticket may not be an unattractive option.
8   
 
Credit Constraints 
We define credit constrained households as those with no (income from) savings 
or investments.  This is a broad definition by which around half of all households are 
constrained and will include some households who are not credit constrained in that they 
can borrow, even if they have no savings.
9 The benefit of our approach is that it yields 
reasonable sample sizes in each of group.  In sensitivity analysis, we have used narrower 
definitions that exclude anyone who owns their home and anyone with household income 
in the top two-third of the distribution and found similar results.    
 
Lottery wins and inheritances  
Since 1997, the BHPS has asked individuals whether they have received any of 
the following financial windfalls in the previous 12 months: a gambling win, an 
inheritance, a life insurance payment, a pension lump sum, a personal accident claim or a 
redundancy payment. Our comparison focuses on gambling wins (referred to here as 
                                                 
8  There are rental outlets that specifically target those with poor credit histories which do not require a 
formal credit check, only five references.  The advertised APR is 30%, but additional insurance which 
consumers are “strongly advised” to take out typically increases the effective rate of interest to more than 
100% (Collard and Kempson, 2005). 
9 Young and Waldron (2008) show that 16% of the UK population is credit constrained, according to self-
reported constraints in the amount that they could borrow, including both perceived constraints that 
discouraged them from applying for credit, and actual constraints where the household was prevented from 
borrowing either by the unavailability of credit or its high price. This is similar to Jappelli (1990) for the 
US who found that c. 20% of US households are credit constrained based on survey evidence that they have 
been refused credit, or put off applying for fear of refusal. In a different line of evidence, Alan and Loranth 
(2010) show that subprime borrowers – about 10% of the UK population – are insensitive to interest rate 
changes and hence likely credit constrained.  20 
lottery wins since this is likely to be the case for most) and inheritances since the other 
windfalls may largely be anticipated (such as pension lump-sums), as we show below, 
and/or may be associated with events that directly affect the purchase of durables (such as 
redundancy payments).
10  
Table 2 shows that the typical amounts received are fairly low for lottery wins and 
are much smaller than for inheritances.  This is not surprising given the structure of 
National Lottery payouts.
11 However, this raises issues for our analysis; in particular, how 
to ensure that we pick up the response to a lottery win compared to inheritance and not 
responses to different sized windfalls. Landsberger (1966) and Keeler, James and Abdel-
Ghany (1985), for example, show that the size of the windfall affects what people do with 
it, with smaller windfalls being more likely to be spent.  
Our approach is to focus on “medium-sized” windfalls of between £100 and 
£5,000.  Anyone who receives a windfall of more than £5,000 in any wave is dropped 
from the analysis and in our initial analysis we ignore small (< £100) lottery wins and 
inheritances.  Focusing on medium wins seems appropriate given our interest in 
consumer durables: larger wins may be associated with more widespread lifestyle 
changes such as moving house, while smaller wins may not be enough to finance the 
purchase of the white goods we focus on.  Furthermore, restricting windfalls to this 
narrower range makes the average lottery win more comparable in size to the average 
inheritance. Within the range £100 - £5,000, lottery wins are still smaller on average than 
inheritances, as shown in Table 2, but the difference is much smaller.  In sensitivity 
analysis (details available on request), we found similar results with narrower ranges of 
£100 - £1000 and £1,001 - £5,000. 
Table 2 summarises separately average windfall payments for those who are 
credit constrained and those who are not. Many of those who are not credit constrained 
receive windfalls from lottery wins, and indeed a higher proportion than among those 
who are credit constrained. This is not inconsistent with people gambling to convexify, 
but is a reminder that this is only one of several possible motives for gambling. The 
                                                 
10We exclude any inheritances that are linked to widow(er)hood, i.e. deaths within the household that may 
have an immediate effect on durable purchase.   
11 The odds of winning £10 are 1:57, compared with odds of 1:1,031 to win around £100, 1:55,490 to win 
around £1,000, 1:2,330,636 to win around £100,000 and 1:13,983,817 to hit the jackpot. 21 
BHPS does not contain information on who has gambled and lost. To provide direct 
evidence on who gambles and how gambling varies with total expenditure, we use data 
from the 2007 UK Expenditure and Food Survey. Figure 4 shows that budget shares on 
gambling decline markedly with total expenditure, consistent with the need to gamble to 
convexify being concentrated among low income groups.  Figure 4 also shows that the 
fraction of households with positive gambling expenditure is around 40% across a wide 
range of incomes, again consistent with the idea of there being more than one motive for 
gambling. In fact, the existence of lottery winners who are not credit constrained is 
necessary for the difference-in-difference strategy described above. 
 
[Figure 4, about here] 
 
Returning to Table 2, within the range we focus on (£100 - £5,000) there is no 
statistically significant difference in average windfall size between those who are 
potentially credit constrained and those who are not. Also, there is no statistically 
significant difference in household income between those who receive a medium-sized 
lottery win and those who receive a medium-sized inheritance.  This is reassuring for our 
difference-in-difference specification.   
 
[Table 2, Descriptive Statistics, about here] 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1.  Main Results 
Our main results, addressing the question “Do durable purchases respond 
differently to lottery wins than to inheritances?”, are shown in Table 3. Column (1) 
presents the results of an OLS regression of durable purchases on lottery winnings, 
inheritances, and additional controls. We model the number of durables purchased during 
the previous twelve months as the dependent variable, but results are very similar using a 
binary indicator for whether or not the household purchased any durables. We include 
both lottery wins and inheritances as amount won (in £’000s) to deal with the fact that, 
even within our narrower range of “medium-sized” wins, the typical lottery win is quite a 
bit smaller than the typical inheritance. 22 
The results indicate a significant response of durables purchases to a lottery win, 
but not to an inheritance. This is consistent with the convexification hypothesis, but, as 
described in the previous section this finding is also consistent with a number of 
alternative interpretations. In Column (2) we interact the windfall variables with a 
dummy variable indicating whether the agent is credit constrained. This corresponds to 
equation (12) above and implements our main “difference-in-different” test. The results 
show that the propensity to purchase durables out of (endogenously-selected) lottery wins 
is significantly greater than the propensity to purchase durables out of an (exogenously-
determined) inheritance for households that are credit constrained. By contrast, there is 
no significant difference among unconstrained households. In Column (3) we show that 
these results are robust to the inclusion of individual fixed-effects.   
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
The convexification hypothesis is a selection mechanism that operates on 
variables (the need for durables, cash on hand) that vary through time, and that operates 
only for the credit-constrained. The results in Column (3), which allow for fixed effects 
in estimating income effects, and which double-difference income effects (across the 
constrained and unconstrained, and across inheritors and lottery winners), rule out any 
alternative selection mechanism which operates on time invariant unobservables, and any 
selection mechanism which is not limited to the credit constrained.  
 
5.2. Are Inheritances Anticipated? 
As noted in the previous section, one potential concern is that inheritances may 
differ from lottery wins in being reasonably well anticipated by the individual.  However, 
there is no evidence of households adjusting either their financial expectations or their 
durable purchases ahead of receiving an inheritance. Table 4 reports the results of a fixed 
effects regression of a binary indicator for whether the (head of the) household expects 
their financial situation to improve over the next 12 months on a set of indicators for 
whether or not the household does in fact receive a lottery win, an inheritance or one of 
the other financial windfalls (life insurance payment, pension lump sum, personal 23 
accident claim, redundancy payment) over the following 12 months, focusing on 
medium-sized windfalls (between £100 - £5,000).  Only the coefficient on other windfalls 
is positive and significant; medium inheritances do not appear to be anticipated. 
Consistent with this, sensitivity analysis (details available on request) that included lead 
terms in the regression analysis to pick up the effect of any anticipated windfalls found no 
significant effects.  
[Table 4 about here] 
5.3. The Small Winnings Test 
Section 4 proposed a second test of the convexification hypothesis based on the 
idea that individuals who receive an inheritance but whom we know to have been 
gambling (because they report very small winnings) should behave like lottery winners 
(rather than like inheritors). The results in Table 5 show that this is exactly what we find 
in our data. Column (1) reproduces (from Column (3) of Table 3) our main difference-in-
difference with individual fixed effects results,  corresponding to equation (12). In 
Column (2) we report estimates of equation (13) in which we interact the inheritances 
variables with a dummy indicating whether the agent reported a small lottery win. We 
find that credit-constrained inheritors that we know to have been gambling exhibit much 
larger income effects than other inheritors. In fact, their responses are not statistically 
different from the lottery winners. This test provides further confirmation that our 
findings in the previous section were not driven by differences in the way individuals 
respond to lottery winnings compared to inheritances.  Instead, it is the characteristics and 
situation of the person who receives the money that matters. Credit-constrained gamblers 
have larger responses and this is consistent with the idea that they are a selected group: 
close to a purchase margin. 
[Table 5 about here] 
5.4. Falsification Test 
Finally, in Table 6 we provide a falsification test based on the fact that the 
convexification hypothesis should generate differences in income effects only for 
indivisible goods. We therefore run the same regression but include weekly household 24 
spending on food on the left-hand side.
12 Consistent with the convexification hypothesis 
and with the predictions of a standard life-cycle model, we find zero income effects for 
both lottery wins and inheritance receipts when we examine food spending. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Overall, our empirical results are fully consistent with the theory presented in Section 2 
and lend strong support to the idea that consumers gamble to convexify.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper sheds light on why risk averse individuals gamble. We find that 
purchases of durables are more responsive to lottery winnings than to inheritances and 
argue that this difference in durable purchase is consistent with individuals gambling to 
convexify. We find this difference while controlling for individual fixed effects; we find  
it only for households who are credit-constrained who might have an incentive to gamble; 
and we find it only in expenditures on indivisible goods. Moreover, we find that an 
inheritance has a larger effect when received by individuals who were playing the lottery: 
it is who receives the money, rather than the source of the money, that matters.  These 
multiple lines of evidence are all consistent with gambling to convexify: the larger 
income effects associated with lottery winnings result from the fact that it is exactly those 
who are close to a purchase threshold who choose to gamble. It is hard to think of another 
plausible explanation that is consistent with all these multiple lines of evidence.   
Our findings are important for a number of reasons. First, our finding highlights 
the difficulty of finding appropriate instruments – in this case for income. The random 
success of winning a lottery would seem to make it a natural instrument for unanticipated 
income changes that should allow for the identification of income effects, as in Imbens et 
al. (2001).  In their conclusion, Imbens et al. (2001) note the caveat that they have “no 
direct evidence concerning the difference of responses to lottery income versus other 
sources of unearned income” (page 793). We provide both evidence of and economic 
motivation for such differences. The decision to play lotteries is itself an economic 
                                                 
12 In the BHPS, the food data are banded and we take the mid-points.  25 
decision that is not independent of the income effect on winning: those who choose to 
play lotteries will display larger income effects than the rest of the population, as our data 
confirm. 
Second, and more fundamentally, our findings provide at least a part of the 
explanation for gambling among low-income households, and also the popularity of so-
called prize-linked savings products amongst these households. Of course, there are other 
reasons for people to gamble besides convexification. Recently, it has been suggested that 
prize-linked savings products could be used to promote saving through the “excitement 
factor” and this may be an important factor for many. However, our research points to 
another potential reason why such products might appeal to low-income households; they 
may allow consumers to overcome indivisibilities potentially more quickly than 
conventional savings products. On the other hand, given the poor return to playing 
lotteries, our evidence that individuals are gambling to finance indivisible purchases 
highlights the lack of financing options available to poor households, and the severity of 
the credit constraints they face.  
Finally, our evidence on how individuals deal with non-convexities provides 
guidance on how we should model the behaviour of those individuals in structural 
models. In particular, the appropriate way to model optimisation by individuals in the 
presence of non-convexities is to allow those individuals to play lotteries. 26 
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Appendix: Proofs of Results 2 and 3 
Proof of Result 2 
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Now  consider separately the incentive to buy a lottery ticket when cash-on-hand is below 
the interval and above the interval.  
 
1) When  
  ()
*
1` 2 1, x xq q <− −  
cash-on-hand in period 2 will be sufficiently low that even if the lottery is won, 
*
22 x x < , 
and so the household does not buy the indivisible good, regardless of the lottery outcome. 
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= = . Since the gamble is actuarially fair and 
utility, u, is concave, the value of not buying a lottery ticket is always greater than the 
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cash-on-hand in period 2 will be sufficiently high that even if the lottery is lost, 
*
22 x x > , 
and so the household buys the indivisible good regardless of the lottery outcome. Thus, 
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And the value of not buying becomes:  
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Since the gamble is actuarially fair and utility, u, is concave, the value of not buying the 
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Proof of Result 3 
 
Result 3: There exists a region,  11 1 , x xx ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦,  which contains
*
2 x  ( )
*
121 x xx << , in which 
the agent will purchase a lottery ticket.  
 
Proof: 
We consider the incentive to buy a lottery ticket in the region of 
*
2 x .   Define the 
difference in utility from purchasing the indivisible good and not purchasing it as  
  32 
() ( ) 22 ux p ux δη =− + −  
We consider separately the incentive ε above and ε below 
*
2 x . 
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q
εη ε
= ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ − ⎡⎤ =− + − + + − − − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠  
And the value of not buying a ticket as: 
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ll EV V q u x p u x q
pq u x q
ε εδ
εδ
== ⎡⎤ −= − − − −− + ⎣⎦
=− − − +
 
 










== ⎡⎤ − > ⎣⎦  
 
2)  Above 
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EV qux p qux
q
εη ε
= ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ − ⎡⎤ =+ + − + + − + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠  
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ll EV V q u x p u x q
pq u x q
ε εδ
εδ
== ⎡⎤ −= − + − −+ − − ⎣⎦












== ⎡⎤ − > ⎣⎦  
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( ) Prob 1 d winner =
 
Lottery Loser 
(had ticket, lost) 
( ) Prob 1 dl o s t =  
Non-winner* 
(losers + non-holders) 
( ) Prob 1 d nonwinner =  
Lottery 
Chosen 























2 1( 1 ) Fx −+  
























































⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ −−
−− − −− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
−
  
* The probabilities of a non-winner purchasing the durable good are approximations to the actual 
probabilities because the exact CDF’s are calculated at different points. Hence the probability of 
purchase by a non-winner when the lottery is chosen is given by:   () ( ) () 1 11 , Fx q λ −− and the 
probability of purchase by a non-winner when the lottery is random is given by:  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
**
22 (1 ) 1 1 (1 ) 1
.
1




−−+ + − −
−
 
However, since  1 x  lies between ( )
*
2 1 x +  and 
*
2 x , evaluating each CDF at the same value of 
*
2 x  is 
a reasonable approximation. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 



























Television  0.128 £381 £568 0.129 £346 £524 0.127 £410 £618 
Fridge freezer  0.086  £316 £356 0.086 £285 £326 0.086 £347 £390 
Washing  machine  0.095 £368 £379 0.097 £337 £347 0.092 £398 £419 
Tumbledrier  0.046 £205 £222 0.049 £190 £205 0.043 £221 £244 
Dishwasher  0.040 £331 £170 0.034 £307 £331 0.047 £351 £378 



























Any  win  0.210  £40 £290  0.152 £30 £422  0.268 £40 £216 
“Medium”  win  0.043 £250 £545 0.031 £250 £596 0.058 £224 £514 
Inheritances           
Any inheritance   0.046  £5,000  £24,949  0.026  £3,000  £16,286  0.066  £7,000  £27,951 























All  29,886  2,487 43.5  15,301  2,063 41.7  13,757  2,959 45.5 
“Medium” lottery winners  1,299  2,919  44.6  497  2,559  42.4  802  3,142  46.0 
“Medium”  inheritances  553 2,918 41.3  190 2,378 38.6  363 3,201 42.7 
 
 
Notes: Credit constrained defined as having no financial savings; Medium gambling win/ inheritance is between £100 - £5,000  
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Table 3: Main regression results 
 
 































    
β1 = γ1  .0022 .6700 .7837
(β1 + β2) = (γ1 + γ2)    .0001 .0346
 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. Credit 
constrained = no income from savings/ dividends; Lottery win (Lot) and 
Inheritance (Inh) are in £’000s. Other controls: Age of head of household and age 
squared; couple; indicators for number of children; home-owner; head of 
household is unemployed, retired, other non-work; spending on food (permanent 
income), financial expectations for next year, year dummies 
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Table 4: Are Windfalls Expected? 
 
Dependent variable:  (0/1), whether household head expects financial situation to 
improve over the next 12 months (Results of fixed effects regression) 
 
 
Whole sample  Credit constrained 
Not credit 
constrained 





















N 27,410  14,508  12,902 
 
Standard errors in brackets. ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level. “Other 
windfalls” include life insurance policy payments, pension lump-sums, redundancy 
payments, personal accident claims and “anything else”  39 
Table 5: Small Winnings Test 
 
  Main results  Further test 
    


















Small_lot × Inh (δ1)    -.0006
(.0043) 




β1 = γ1  .7837 .7693
(β1 + β2) = (γ1 + γ2)  .0346 .0102
(δ1 + δ2) = 0    .0396
(β1 + β2) = ((γ1 + γ2)+ (δ1 + δ2))    .5400
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level.  
Credit constrained = no income from savings/ dividends; Lottery win (Lot) and Inheritance (Inh) 
are in £’000s. Small_lot is an indicator if the household receives a lottery win of less than £100.  
Other controls: Age of head of household and age squared; couple; indicators for number of 
children; home-owner; head of household is unemployed, retired, other non-work; spending on 




Table 6: Falsification Test 
  
 
Number of durables 
purchased in last 12 months 
Spending 
on food 




















β1 = γ1  .7837 .3834
(β1 + β2) = (γ1 + γ2)  .0346 .4710
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level.  
Credit constrained = no income from savings/ dividends; Lottery win (Lot) and Inheritance (Inh) 
are in £’000s. Other controls: Age of head of household and age squared; couple; indicators for 
number of children; home-owner; head of household is unemployed, retired, other non-work; 
spending on food (permanent income), financial expectations for next year, year dummies 